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Abstract
In this article we analyse features of the information inﬂuence operations run by the
St. Petersburg based Internet Research Agency, targeted at Europe. Informed by publicly
available ‘open source’ data, the analysis delineates three key tactics that underpinned their
disinformation campaign: account buying; ‘follower ﬁshing’; and narrative switching. Both
individually and collectively these were designed to build the reach, impact and inﬂuence of
the ideologically loaded messages that social media account operators authored and ampli-
ﬁed. The particular value of the analysis is that whilst a lot of recent public and political
attention has focussed upon Kremlin backed disinformation in respect of the 2016 United
States presidential election, far less work has addressed their European activities.
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WITH HINDSIGHT, the sheer scale and scope of
activities performed by the St. Petersburg
based Internet Research Agency (IRA) and
allied Kremlin units attempting to inﬂuence
and interfere with the 2016 US presidential
election process, suggests much more could
have been done to interdict their efforts. For
as described by two recent studies commis-
sioned by the US Senate Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence—from Oxford
University and New Knowledge—and the
indictments ﬁled by Special Counsel Mueller,
the Russian backed activities were extensive,
diverse and pervaded all major social media
platforms. That said, doubts remain about
precisely what impact they accomplished. In
their recent book Network Propaganda, the Har-
vard academics Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris
and Hal Roberts have cautioned that digital
inﬂuencing activity does not easily translate
into measurable behaviour change.1 Thus we
need to be wary of over-attributing any causal
effects to even the most sophisticated disinfor-
mation campaign.
Set against this backdrop, given that digi-
tal inﬂuence engineering is now being
undertaken regularly and routinely, this arti-
cle highlights three issues. First, the impor-
tance of developing a better understanding
of how Russian state assets have sought to
use disinformation and misinformation to
inﬂuence European politics. For understand-
able reasons, much of the public conversa-
tion to-date has focussed upon the American
situation. But there is signiﬁcant evidence of
similar inﬂuence and interference strategies
being operationalised in Europe. Under-
standing this arena is especially timely,
given that the European parliamentary elec-
tions are scheduled for May 2019.
Second, although the Senate commissioned
studies did a commendable job in document-
ing and describing the volume and variety
of Kremlin backed inﬂuence campaigning,
the amount of material involved means there
is more to do in terms of distilling the IRA’s
disinformation playbook. Detailed ‘digital
forensic’ investigative methods are needed to
craft an evidence-based understanding of
how IRA operators built their audience and
inﬂuence. This is on the grounds that identi-
fying their key tactics and techniques may
enable similar disinformation campaigns to
be detected in other contexts.
Finally, we discuss some of the challenges
with attributing authorship and impact to dis-
information communications. This reﬂects
how, not only have the US and its allies
learned about some of the methods used to
seed and amplify false and misleading infor-
mation online, so too have those authoring
such messages. Contemporary efforts at
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communicating disinforming narratives are
increasingly sophisticated, as those involved
are learning ‘what works’ in making messages
more persuasive and in masking their origins.
Two main data sources underpin the evi-
dence and insights reported. First, there are
a small number of published accounts and
stories from former workers at the Internet
Research Agency describing its organisation
and routines. This is supplemented by analy-
sis of the ‘FiveThirtyEight Internet Research
Agency Twitter dataset’—an extensive non-
anonymised corpus of tweets posted by IRA
accounts. As detailed below, this includes a
large number of Russian language and
American facing accounts. But there were
also accounts messaging in a number of
other languages. Herein we focus in particu-
lar on accounts that were oriented towards
Germany, as much less attention has
focussed upon what these were doing.
Work at the Internet Research
Agency
There are at least seven published journalis-
tic accounts, based upon interviews with for-
mer employees at the Internet Research
Agency. Collectively, these provide insights
into the nature of the work it performed,
including the organisation of decision mak-
ing and delivery, main roles and responsibil-
ities, and the performance indicators workers
were subject to. By collating and analysing
these materials, it is possible to construct an
outline picture of the organisational rhythms
and routines that shaped the kinds of digital
behaviours presenting in the social media
accounts they were operating.
The picture painted is of an organisation
based around an orthodox division of labour
with different departments focussing upon
speciﬁc geographic regions/countries, accom-
panied by some platform specialisation.2 For
example, one unit focussed upon producing
memes, whilst another was tasked with com-
menting on posts by other users. Individual
operators ran multiple fake accounts: trolls
were expected to make around ﬁfty com-
ments on news articles every day. Or, they
were tasked with maintaining six Facebook
pages, posting three times daily about the
news, and discussing new developments in
groups on Facebook twice daily, with a target
of at least 500 subscribers by the end of the
ﬁrst month. On Twitter, operators were gener-
ally responsible for around ten accounts with
up to 2,000 followers each, tweeting at least
ﬁfty times daily.3 One source suggests they
were required to make 135 comments per
twelve-hour shift, working in internet forums
and that they would be provided with ﬁve
keywords to feature in all posts to encourage
search engine pickup.4 The latter is consistent
with workers describing receiving regular
‘taskings’ from their managers in terms of a
list of subjects/topics to focus upon.5 Similar
tasks were deﬁned in relation to targeting
comments towards outlets such as CNN, BBC
and the New York Times.6
One interviewee described working in
teams of three: operator one would function
as ‘the villain’ criticising the authorities; then
the others would enter a debate with him/
her. One would post an image/meme in
support of their argument, the other posting
a link to a supportive source.7 Other intrigu-
ing comments include a suggested pattern
for developing accounts in that they are
started with a politically neutral stance,
which is amended later.8 Operators wrote
Twitter bots to amplify visibility and because
the costs of doing so were low.9 A few oper-
ators were ideologically committed to their
work, but most were not. Workforce turn-
over was high and featured a lot of young
people and students.10
These organisational arrangements certainly
help make sense of some of the patterns that
can be observed in the messaging data. For
example, sixteen conﬁrmed Internet Research
Agency accounts all used quotations from
Orwell, Shakespeare and other famous liter-
ary ﬁgures as part of the account biography.
Similarly, a second group of accounts all
shared fragments of the same base image as
the account proﬁle picture. There is a strong
probability that these were individuals engag-
ing cognitive shortcuts to get the job done
quickly. Given that the staff were under con-
siderable pressure to meet their performance
metrics and were not necessarily deeply
invested in their work, these are precisely the
kinds of ‘easing behaviours’ found in many
organisational settings. Analogous to what
happens in police detective work and psycho-
logical proﬁling, these little ‘tells’ and
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behavioural signatures can be used as clues
about where suspicions should be directed.
One especially salient point though is that
these social media accounts that were used
for spreading disinformation were not trans-
mitting such materials all the time. Although
there was quite considerable variation,
broadly speaking they seemed to operate
around an 80:20 ratio. That is, most of the
time these accounts were engaged in mim-
icking the kinds of interests and values
coherent with the social identities that they
were ‘spooﬁng’, and then occasionally they
would message avowedly political content.
This pattern of behaviour was aided by the
fact that many accounts would expend a lot
of time ‘amplifying’ messages from other
users, and then only rarely ‘authoring’ new
material themselves. Such patterns are
important as they render the task of deﬁni-
tively attributing accounts to Kremlin direc-
tion and control challenging.
How IRA accounts built audience
and inﬂuence
Spooﬁng personas in terms of constructing a
false account proﬁle, and then messaging
around issues of interest to the thought com-
munities associated with such digital social
identities, was critical to how IRA accounts
built a following to enhance their persuasive
capacity and capability. Many did so over
several years, but not all did. Some tried to
shortcut the process of building audience
and inﬂuence.
Buying followers
An alternative to the normal organic strategy
and long-term investment required to grow
follower numbers, is to ‘buy’ a following.
Websites such as ‘buycheapfollowerslikes.org’
offer to increase a client’s Twitter following
by 1,000 accounts for less than $20. According
to reviews, the followers have proﬁle pictures,
unique bios and are active tweeters; however
they will not interact with posts, as they are
bots. This is what is depicted in Figure 1,
which is an account run by the IRA that sim-
ply purchased follower accounts when set up.
It is not clear whether such an action was per-
formed as part of the overarching organisa-
tional strategy, or because a worker was
‘gaming’ the performance measures they were
subject to. In the graph, a running total of
tweets are plotted on the X axis and follower
count on the Y axis. The dotted line represents
its followers and the solid line those accounts
it is following.
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
1
38
7
77
3
11
59
15
45
19
31
23
17
27
03
30
89
34
75
38
61
42
47
46
33
50
19
54
05
57
91
61
77
65
63
69
49
73
35
77
21
81
07
84
93
88
79
92
65
96
51
10
03
7
10
42
3
10
80
9
11
19
5
11
58
1
11
96
7
12
35
3
12
73
9
13
12
5
13
51
1
13
89
7
14
28
3
14
66
9
15
05
5
Running total of tweets
TodayInSyria
following followers
Figure 1: Example of an account purchasing followers
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In this case, the English language account
was initiated in 2015 by it acquiring 10,000
followers in a very short period of time. We
have identiﬁed similar patterns of behaviour
in several of the German language IRA
accounts, as exempliﬁed in Figure 2.
On 4 June 2016, this account very rapidly
received 5,000 new followers. As can be seen
at two later points on the graph, the follower
count drops by around 1,000 accounts; this
is likely due to the fake accounts being dis-
covered and banned by Twitter. The number
of followers is also unusually high: research
suggests the average Twitter account has 453
followers.11
Follower ﬁshing
A second pattern of behaviour designed to
build audience and inﬂuence is ‘follower
ﬁshing’. The logic of which is outlined by
the metrics in Figure 3 below, based upon
an English language account.
Around half of the most active IRA ‘Ger-
man’ Twitter accounts engaged in proliﬁc
‘follower ﬁshing’, with thousands of accounts
being followed and unfollowed regularly. The
tactic works by the IRA accounts following
hundreds or thousands of new accounts in a
very short time frame. The aim is to get the
newly added accounts to reciprocate by
following the IRA account (follow-back).
After a few days, the IRA operator then
unfollows the accounts, increasing their ‘fol-
lowers per followed’ ratio and with it boost-
ing the account’s implied ‘authority’, at least
in terms of how this is assessed by platform
algorithms. This tactic is commonly used by
‘social media inﬂuencers’, such as celebrities
or marketers. Figure 4 tracks this pattern in
relation to a German language account.
The solid line documents how this account
followed other accounts over time. They added
thousands of accounts in a very compressed
time frame hoping to get ‘follow-backs’. How-
ever, a high following to follower ratio
indicates a low Twitter authority score, so they
need frequently to stop following thousands of
accounts as well. This creates a step like pat-
tern of steep rises and sharp drops.
The longitudinal analysis to detect these
kinds of behavioural patterns is time-
consuming. But in an attempt to test how
widespread it was, we analysed sixty-nine
randomly selected IRA Twitter accounts, with
different country focusses. Table 1 shows dra-
matic differences between the behaviour of
accounts ‘representing’ different countries. For
example, no Italian, but 86 per cent of the US
accounts reviewed employed follower ﬁshing
to increase their followers and 21 per cent pur-
chased followers.
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Within the large amount of mainstream
media commentary that has attended to the
activities of the IRA over the past couple of
years, seventeen spoofed accounts have
acquired a certain public infamy,12 either
owing to the contents of their messaging or
the relatively sizeable numbers of followers
they had. All of them engaged in follower
ﬁshing to build audience and inﬂuence.
Narrative switching
A third pattern of IRA account behaviour
was ‘narrative switching’. The operators
would start by talking about fairly mundane
issues, consistent with the spoofed owner’s
persona. However, at some point, often after
an extended time period, messages became
overtly political and frequently aligned with
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Figure 3: Basic pattern of ﬁshing for followers
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Figure 4: German example of ‘follower ﬁshing’
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established pro-Russian interest narratives.
The IRA not only switched from banal to
pro-Russian views, but also switched
abruptly between different political positions
according to current Russian operational
priorities, or even just to create confusion.
Narrative switching can also be used to col-
lect certain followers, for example people
interested in French yellow jacket protests,
so that they can be targeted with messages
at a later time. In some instances, these
switches happened after the account was
dormant for a time. However, this was not
always the case.
A collection of IRA accounts were identi-
ﬁed where there was a signiﬁcant ‘pause’ in
their messaging, lasting several months.
Potentially, this might mean that they were
dormant accounts that had been purchased
by IRA operators. Alternatively, this break
could have been used to suppress past politi-
cal afﬁliations so the account could be ‘re-
purposed’ by the operator. Another theory
suggests dormancy because IRA operational
priorities had changed. For example, German
accounts can only really be used to inﬂuence
German opinion. As such, if IRA manage-
ment or their political overseers had deter-
mined an alternative priority for their staff,
then these accounts may have been less rele-
vant, and the operators’ attention directed
elsewhere.
Figure 5 shows the graph for one German
account displaying this pattern of behaviour.
At some point during the break, 80 per cent
of this account’s tweets were deleted by its
operator. On 14 June 2016 it began tweeting
again, but with seventy-ﬁve followers
instead of the eight it had previously. The
tweets appear to be just news headlines from
Germany and around the world, most of
which are retweets.
Previously, this account had posted anti-
Alternative f€ur Deutschland (AfD) statements,
such as: ‘at least she is not populist stupid as
the afd in #merkelmuststay’: ‘the people who
choose the #afd are just sick # MerkelMustS-
tay’; and, ‘#AfD is shit, AFD is shit
#MerkelMustStay’. On 24 September, how-
ever, it suddenly started posting original pro-
AfD tweets including: ‘I #chooseAfD, because
I remember # asylum crisis and no longer
trust #Merkel!’; ‘I #chooseAfD, because I want
to live in the Federal Republic instead of Cali-
phate #Germany!’; and retweeting ‘Every
German #Patriot will vote #AfD tomorrow!
We need a political earthquake to save #Ger-
many! # Btw17 #NoAntifa #NoIslam’.
Possible (unsubstantiated) explanations for
this switch in position are that it was a direct
response to Chancellor Merkel’s public state-
ment on 14 September that the EU would
not consider lifting sanctions on Russia.13 In
the September elections AfD achieved what
The Guardian called a ‘stunning success’;
meanwhile Merkel’s party had their worst
result since World War II.14 It should be
noted that although each of the eleven
accounts posted pro-AfD tweets, their num-
bers were small compared to the pro-Merkel
tweets they had previously shared. One rea-
son for this could be that the German
authorities were said to be on the lookout
for Russian interference and operators were
directed by their managers to be subtler than
in the past.
Table 1: Regional summary of IRA behaviour
Region Total
Accounts
Follower
Fishing
FF % Purchased
Followers
Purchased %
Ukraine 3 1 33% 2 67%
Iraq 7 1 14% 1 14%
Italy 8 0 0% 0 0%
United Kingdom 9 6 67% 2 22%
Germany 11 4 36% 1 9%
United States 14 12 86% 3 21%
Famous Accounts
(Unknown/US)
17 17 100% 4 24%
Totals 69 41 59% 13 19%
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Synchronicity analysis
As noted previously, IRA operators were
required to run multiple accounts and to gen-
erate certain volumes of activity. This pro-
vides an opportunity for attributing accounts
to Kremlin direction and control by analysing
temporal sequences of messaging behaviour.
The method for doing this involves ‘syn-
chronicity analysis’ as it looks for simultane-
ous patterns of messaging as a way of
identifying where multiple accounts are
being controlled by the same author.
The potential power and value of syn-
chronicity analysis is demonstrated by exam-
ining the posting activities of eleven proliﬁc
IRA accounts adopting a pro-Merkel stance.
On 21 July 2016, @Martin_S32 posted its ﬁrst
tweet of the day ‘Mommy is the best
#MerkelMustStay’. In total, it posted 265
tweets that day, most displaying very strong
support for Angela Merkel. Initially it was
assumed that this might be one of a small
number of known Russian accounts adopting
this stance, with others communicating more
extreme right-wing messages. Further investi-
gation revealed, however, that a series of IRA
accounts were communicating messages sup-
portive of the German Chancellor. Even more
signiﬁcantly, when the timings of these mes-
sages were plotted, they displayed a very sim-
ilar pattern. Figure 6 plots these activity
patterns on a time-line. The larger the bubble,
the greater the volume of messages sent at
that point in time by that account.
It can be observed that the key ‘pulses’ of
messaging activity are very similar, but not
identical. All of these accounts stopped post-
ing tweets on 12 August and then were inac-
tive for a minimum of six months. The
inference drawn is that these accounts were
probably being controlled by one author,
possibly using a system such as Tweetdeck.
This would be consistent with the working
arrangements at the Internet Research
Agency described above.
In July and August 2016, these accounts
sent hundreds of pro-Merkel tweets, often
using the hashtag #MerkelMustStay. As with
other IRA tweets, they frequently integrated
an unrelated trending hashtag in order to
push their own hashtag, for example
#WorldElephantDay. These posts came dur-
ing a period when Angela Merkel was under
intense political pressure to step down as
Chancellor, with Reuters noting that in Jan-
uary, 40 per cent of Germans thought she
should resign over her refugee policy.15 This
would be consistent with the Russian state’s
known modus operandi for seeking to lever-
age political weakness to amplify social and
political tensions.
Germany was subject to a series of terror-
ist attacks between 18 July and 26 July 2016,
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Figure 5: Example of ‘narrative switching’
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in which ﬁfteen people died. The so-called
Islamic State claimed responsibility for two
of the attacks and three of the attackers were
asylum seekers.16 The Nice terror attack also
occurred in July, sending shockwaves
around Europe. Despite this sequence of
events, these accounts were very supportive
of the Merkel government’s refugee policy:
‘Lady #Merkel, Stick to your line! “The
#refugees” are not dangerous mass but peo-
ple! # MerkelMustStay’; and ‘The refugee
policy of Mrs. Merkel shows that she is com-
passionate! #MerkelMustStay’.
Consistent with this line, all of the
accounts disparaged the anti-immigration
AfD, with multiple variations of ‘#AfD is
shit, AfD is shit #MerkelMustStay’ being
posted during a time when polls were sug-
gesting AfD was enjoying some mainstream
support (35 per cent CDU to 12 per cent
AfD).17 The media has typically blamed Rus-
sia for supporting populist/anti-immigrant
parties, but at a point where Merkel (and EU
unity) was politically weakened, Russian
controlled accounts were messaging support
for her domestically. There were signiﬁcant
similarities between the content of tweets
being posted by these accounts. Some were
copied verbatim, and others had single word
differences, usually a hashtag. Combined
with the timings of the tweets, this points to
the likelihood of a single person or team
operating all of these accounts in a co-ordi-
nated strategic fashion.
Synchronicity analysis revealed this group
comprised forty-ﬁve accounts, thirty-four
more than we had previously discovered. It
also revealed another German team of
twenty-ﬁve accounts operating in a very dif-
ferent manner, obsessed with Brexit, with
three of their top ﬁve hashtags directly
related to the Brexit vote. These posted a
variety of messages that promoted the idea
of leaving the EU such as: ‘#Brexit will only
have small consequences! You cannot act in
the EU #BritainInOut #GoodbyeUK #Remai-
nINEU #EUref’ and ‘Do not let yourself be
manipulated with fear. #Brexit #BrexitOrNot
#GoodbyeUK #BritainInOut’. Confusingly,
these same accounts also posted anti-UK
messages in apparent offence that the British
public had chosen to leave, tweeting ‘#bri-
taininout #goodbyeUK Let them drown on
their island now’ and ‘#britaininout #good-
byeUK We do not need snobs’.
In direct opposition to the pro-Merkel
accounts, the latter group invoked anti-refu-
gee sentiments: ‘#britaininout #goodbyeUK
You ﬂee like #Refugees’ and ‘#britaininout
#goodbyeUK Take refugees with you!’. They
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Figure 6: Pro-Merkel accounts schedule
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also blamed Merkel’s migration policy for
increasing terror in Europe ‘Thank you, Mrs
Merkel, that citizens now have to be afraid
of terror in Europe. #stopptTerror’ and
spouted populist rhetoric ‘Why can not our
warships send these #migrants back immedi-
ately? #stopptTerror’. The Russians were
amplifying both sides of the political argu-
ment simultaneously, trying to increase the
social ﬁssures associated with them.
When the high proﬁle (infamous) Internet
Research Agency accounts, were tested in
this way only two (@southlonestar and
@southlonestar2) could be linked through
synchronicity analysis (the latter appears to
have been set up as a ‘backup’ in case Twit-
ter suspended @southlonestar). One possible
implication of this is that if an account
achieved a certain scale of inﬂuence, then
operators focussed on running that one per-
sona. Alternatively, it may simply be an arte-
fact of higher skill operators being in charge
of these accounts.
Rather than just retrospective linkage, syn-
chronicity analysis has two potential uses
going forward. First, if there is an identiﬁed
Kremlin controlled account, then treating
temporal pulses of messaging activity as a
behavioural signature might enable identiﬁ-
cation of other ‘accounts of interest’. Equally
possible is that, with a number of accounts,
the presence of similar pulsing sequences
can be interpreted as a potential indicator of
a common controller.
To test the potential of these methods we
applied them to all 2,848 Twitter accounts
featuring in the full Twitter dataset. The
results are represented graphically in Fig-
ure 7 where the nodes represent IRA Twitter
accounts, shaded by clusters. Some clusters
have had their shapes changed to make
them easier to differentiate.
Representing the data in this way, the
closeness in proximity between two con-
nected accounts indicates how similar their
tweeting activity is. Thus, the large cluster in
the centre of the graphic (box A) represents
449 accounts that have their region predomi-
nantly set to Russia and tweet primarily in
Russian. This is signiﬁcant in that it reﬂects
the pre-eminent strategic objective of the
Russian state, in terms of the perceived
importance of managing domestic public
opinion and in the ‘near abroad’. This
provides an important corrective to much of
the public debate that has taken place in the
West about Kremlin disinformation cam-
paigns, which has worried predominantly
about impacts in these contexts. But this
focus neglects just how much of the IRA’s
effort was directed towards inﬂuencing the
views and perceptions of Russian speakers.
In addition to the main cluster, the linked
accounts in the top right-hand corner and
constituting the second largest group (box
B), look to be those associated with the IRA’s
American department. Intriguingly, in terms
of their temporal activity proﬁles and mes-
sage contents, these could be loosely con-
nected to a much smaller group of Russian
facing accounts. The latter were probably
engaged in covering similar topics, but for a
different audience.
Around the edges of the diagram, are a
large number of smaller ‘satellite’ clusters. The
accounts here can often be distinguished on
the basis of them using different languages, or
focussing upon particular social identity poli-
tics (such as Black Lives Matter). Box C shows
a cluster of forty-ﬁve German accounts, which
include the pro-Merkel accounts we talked
about earlier. In total, 2,031 or 71 per cent of
the IRA Twitter accounts in the dataset could
be linked to at least one other, comprising 119
separate clusters. This affords a clear sense of
how multiple accounts were being employed
by IRA operators to push key messages in a
co-ordinated fashion.
The attribution challenge
Detailed forensic analysis methodologies of
the kind outlined above are necessary for
establishing an evidence base for detecting
current and future activities of a similar nat-
ure. This is important given the increasing
difﬁculties associated with conﬁdently
attributing accounts involved in communi-
cating disinformation to Kremlin direction
and control, as they have become increas-
ingly sophisticated. Not all disinformation
comes from overseas; much of it is authored
by citizens resident in Western countries.
When such sources are mis-attributed, it is
especially problematic, as it negatively
impacts public conﬁdence in the authorities
involved and can be used as propaganda
against them.
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Such challenges have been exacerbated by
a general recalcitrance on the part of the prin-
cipal social media platforms to admit proac-
tively that malign actors are operating on
their systems. Whilst they have responded to
these issues when pushed by governments,
their responses in terms of increasing restric-
tions to application programming interface
(API) access and related interventions have,
somewhat ironically, also made it harder for
independent researchers to assist in detecting
and attributing disinforming communications
to Kremlin backed accounts. There is a dan-
ger that the platform providers are manoeu-
vring into an arrangement where only they
are positioned routinely to detect bad actors.
Further challenges to the work of attribut-
ing disinformation has resulted from the
strategy pursued when a suspected Kremlin
backed account (or accounts) are detected.
Typically, steps are taken either to ‘take
down’ the account from the platform, or to
‘expose’ its presence through publicising its
suspicious activities. The issue is that such
approaches are of limited effectiveness in
altering the dynamics of the disinformation
ecosystem. Moreover, this has enabled the
IRA and other Kremlin backed units to learn
how they are being detected and to adapt
their methods accordingly, the consequence
being that some of their approaches have
become more sophisticated and harder to
detect. Far more impactive, therefore, in
terms of leveraging disruption on the capac-
ity and capability to spread disinformation,
is a strategy that seeks to build an under-
standing of a disinformation network over
time, and implements interventions against
multiple nodes simultaneously. This is how
police investigators have learned to do dis-
ruptions of criminal networks in ofﬂine
spaces to maximise impact.
Conclusion
In his coruscating account of life in Russia
and the state’s normalised use of ‘soft facts’
to convey multiple and shifting ‘truths’ to its
citizens, Peter Pomerantsev, articulates how
the aggregating effect is a profound suspen-
sion of belief.18 Unlike classic propaganda,
the design is not intended to seduce people
to invest in a particular ‘truth’, but rather to
render them in a state of profound and radi-
cal doubt about what to believe—a state of
epistemic anarchy.
One of the most striking aspects of the
growing number of analyses of the IRA’s
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Figure 7: Network graph of synchronicity analysis on all IRA accounts
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activity, especially around the 2016 US presi-
dential election, is just how extensive and
varied it was. This, notwithstanding, it is
equally vital to recognise that similar efforts
have been deployed across a number of other
situations and settings. With this in mind,
what is required now is a series of detailed
and forensic analyses, of the kind outlined
herein, to distil the key operational tactics
and techniques that were being used. If this
can be accomplished, then it enhances capac-
ity and capability to detect similar attempts
going forward, and to constrain their efﬁcacy.
The particular value of the behavioural
models discussed is that they document
fairly unusual patterns of activity that func-
tion as ‘signatures’ or ‘tells’ that an account
is possibly being run by an operator with
speciﬁc intents. The potential is one that is
similar to how police detectives use beha-
vioural signatures to proﬁle repeat offenders:
their digital equivalents can be used to
detect malign inﬂuencers online. A beneﬁt of
the kinds of diagnostic data used to ascertain
these behaviours is that they are largely lan-
guage agnostic and do not rely upon an abil-
ity to read and interpret the contents of
what is being communicated.
At this precise moment, it is difﬁcult to
know how worried we should collectively be
about disinformation communication. There
are indications that despite the efforts of
governments, intelligence agencies and plat-
form providers, misinformation and disinfor-
mation is becoming an endemic feature of
the modern media ecosystem. And whilst
there is certainly something objectionable
about attempted behaviour modiﬁcation in
respect of democratic processes and out-
comes, there is actually remarkably little
robust evidence that such disinforming com-
munications have a discernible measurable
impact upon how the majority of people
think, feel or act. Messaging of this kind
may be better at ‘channelling’ peoples’ pre-
existing values and opinions than it is in
changing them. Perhaps then it is more
appropriate to argue that disinformation has
more impact in shaping the issues we collec-
tively think about, than what we individu-
ally think. That is, its pernicious inﬂuence
resides in framing and agenda setting what
troubles come to be deﬁned as key public
policy problems.
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